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SYMPOSIUM ON AFRICA AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGIMES
THE NEXT GENERATION OF U.S.-AFRICA TRADE INSTRUMENTS
Kathleen Claussen*
This essay examines the challenges and opportunities for regional trade lawmaking in the U.S.-Africa relation-
ship. On the eve of the conclusion of an African continental free trade agreement, he U.S. trade law relationship
with the continent remains focused on regional groups. Questions remain as to whether the existing trade law
regime offers the flexibility necessary to accommodate alternative models to free trade agreements that may
best serve the needs of African and U.S. constituencies. The essay proceeds in four parts. First, I sketch the current
state of play in U.S.-Africa trade relations. Next, I outline how the U.S. and African approaches to trade lawmaking
have differed. I then turn to two sets of challenges-one domestic and one international-that may impede inno-
vation in developing a U.S.-Africa trade law relationship consistent with African interests. Finally, the essay con-
cludes with an exploration of possible alternatives and issues not yet considered in the transcontinental dialogue on
trade.
Background on U.S.-Africa Trade Relations
On May 5, 2017, the African Union Commission announced the conclusion of the latest round of negotiations
toward a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA). The work to negotiate the CFTA comes as part of a larger con-
tinental initiative begun in the 1990s with the Abuja Treaty-an ambitious instrument setting out a roadmap
toward a highly integrated African Economic Community, similar to the European Union, by 2028. The roadmap
has given way to an Action Plan on Boosting Intra-Africa Trade that identifies priority actions and that encourages
subcontinental initiatives as building blocks toward a continental community. In some respects, it may be said that
no encouragement is needed for subcontinental economic communities to flourish in Africa. The African Union
recognizes eight such communities already.
Each of these subcontinental communities has some degree of a relationship with the United States. Alongside
these interactions, U.S.-African economic relations are driven largely by the African Growth and Opportunity Act
(AGOA),' which creates bilateral trading privileges between African countries and the United States, reducing
tariffs and creating opportunities for African products in the U.S. market where the exporting country is deemed
eligible for such treatment. The United States also has eleven trade and investment framework agreements (TIFAs)
with sub-Saharan African countries and regional economic organizations; a Trade, Investment, and Development
Cooperative Agreement with the five countries of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and bilateral
investment treaties with six sub-Saharan African partners. The Obama Administration put into place two addi-
tional initiatives-Power Africa and Trade Africa-to further expand economic ties with the African continent.
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In 2015, the U.S. Congress extended the AGOA program until 2025.2 At that time, the U.S. executive will need
to work with Congress to review the future of U.S.-Africa trade policy-making. Regardless of the state of play in
2025, the elements put in place in the near term will shape the options available eight years from now. These devel-
opments merit further attention from policy-makers and from the academic community. While scholars and prac-
titioners have focused heavily in recent years on the significance of regional trade agreements by the United States
and others, they have not examined fully U.S.-Africa relations through that lens.
As more regional and bilateral trade agreements have been negotiated and proposed by the leading economies in
the world, some commentators have suggested that trade lawmaking is characterized by a "megaregionalism,"
which has taken as its focal point the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) negotiated by the United
States and eleven partners in the Asia-Pacific region between 2009 and 2016. Alongside the TPP negotiations,
the United States also undertook negotiations toward a free trade agreement with the European Union called
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, with a view to creating a new era of deep and faster national
regulatory alignment outside the World Trade Organization (WTO).
It is unclear as yet where African regionalism fits in this trend. On the one hand, we may expect the initiatives of
the United States that seek to build trade regulatory capacity in Africa to serve as a catalyst for continental inte-
gration toward a more robust U.S.-Africa economic instrument. Alternatively, if certain African subcontinental
economic communities move more quickly than others with respect to regulatory goals and standards advanced
by the United States, this disparity across the continental groups could further decelerate momentum for a larger
cooperation project.
U.S. Unformity and African Variation in FTAs
Compared with most features of the international legal system, the preferential trade law system is in the early stages
of its reinstitutionalization with the United States and the African continent taking certain leading steps in that process.
The growth of regional and bilateral trade arrangements is not unique to the United States and Africa, however. The
WTO reports 274 preferential trade agreements in force among its members as of May 5, 2017.' That number, espe-
cially its recent and continued increase, leaves no doubt that this type of trade agreement negotiation is alive and well,
and that this trend is the most important global trade law development since the creation of the WTO. Regional and
bilateral agreements have eclipsed the WTO in some elements of importance, not all economic.
The United States has free trade agreements (FTAs) with twenty countries, including countries in North and
South America, Northern Africa, the Asia-Pacific region, and the Middle East. Important for this analysis is that
nearly all those agreements have taken a similar form and contain similar content, especially in certain chapters,
although they have grown in length and scope over the last twenty years. In some subject areas, the same text is
repeated across all or almost all recent agreements.
By contrast, African trade agreements internal to the continent and beyond vary significantly. The eight regional
economic communities recognized by the African Union have considerable overlap in membership but diversity in
activity: the East African Community (EAC); the Economic Community of West African States; the Southern Africa
Development Community (SADC); the Arab Maghreb Union; the Intergovernmental Authority on Development;
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the Community of Sahel-Saharan States; and the
Economic Community of Central African States. Other institutions of regional integration complement those offi-
cially recognized: the SACU; the Central African Economic and Monetary Community; the West African Economic
and Monetary Union; and a planned Tripartite Free Trade Area among COMESA, EAC, and SADC. Unlike the
2 The extension was part of the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-27, 129 Stat. 362 (2015).
3 See Regional Trade Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION.
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relative uniformity across the U.S. trade agreements, the founding instruments of these regional economic arrange-
ments contain far fewer similar elements. There is considerable variation in their scope and implementation.
With this variegated terrain in mind, what are the possibilities for a U.S.-Africa or a U.S.-region-of-Africa FTA?
As has been noted, no African government has stated publicly that it is prepared to meet the obligations set out in
the U.S. framework legislation for U.S. FTAs.' Those obligations are extensive, based on past practice with other
U.S. trading partners, and call for advanced regulatory developments in the international economic regime. Those
obligations that the United States is likely to require of African partner communities pose the first of two major
challenges to a U.S.-Africa or U.S.-region-of-Africa FTA in the coming years. The second major challenge is the
international dimension: FTAs are converging around the same obligations, led by the U.S. model. I review both
challenges below before considering the prospects for an alternative framework.
Challenges to a U.S.-Africa FTA
Although the AGOA Extension and Enhancement Act of 2015 declares that it is the policy of the United States
to promote the negotiation of trade agreements with individual sub-Saharan African countries a  well as with the
regional economic communities, it does not provide a clear blueprint to reach this goal. The traditional path taken
by the United States with trading partners over the last twenty years of expansive, binding, and enforceable multi-
sector agreements may not be appropriate or preferred by African trading partners. At the same time, an alterna-
tive vision of an FTA, with at least some of the fundamental features of an FTA, may not be possible. The first
reason an alternative FTA model could be challenging has to do with the relationship between the U.S. Congress
and the U.S. executive branch. Since 1974, nearly every U.S. trade agreement has come into force through what is
known as the "trade promotion authority" (TPA) process. TPA creates a political and constitutional balance
through which the Congress authorizes the President to negotiate and enter into agreements. Congress grants
the President his authority for a limited period of time, although the President is not bound with respect to trading
partner selection. With the exception of one agreement hat entered into force in the Clinton Administration (the
U.S.-Jordan FTA), the U.S. Congress has implemented only agreements negotiated under the TPA mandate. Thus,
TPA has become the de facto singular way for the United States to negotiate and conclude trade agreements, not-
withstanding that the TPA is time-bound.
TPA legislation includes strategic negotiating objectives contemplated by the Congress for the executive. Over
the years, Congress has added lengthy substantive objectives specific to each chapter. The most recent (2015) TPA
legislation includes fourteen pages of congressional objectives for the executive. While the negotiating objectives
provided by Congress are ostensibly intended to serve as guidelines for the executive in negotiating FTAs, in some
instances, the language of the final agreement matches the language of the TPA "objectives" verbatim. In certain
elements of U.S. trade agreements, the congressional negotiating objectives in TPA or other congressionally sanc-
tioned language set out in TPA have become the floor and the ceiling for the text agreed with U.S. trading part-
ners.5 Congress thus shapes the language of U.S. trade agreements in away unmatched by other legislatures around
the world. The prospect for improvements and creative changes in future FTAs is significantly tempered by this
path dependence, and, as a result, U.S. trading partners must be prepared to meet these congressionally-identified
obligations if they wish to conclude a traditional FTA with the United States.
A second reason innovation in or a creative alternative to a U.S.-Africa FTA could be limited is the centripetal
force of the international trade law system. Across the proliferation of trade agreements over the last twenty years,
there is notable convergence in normative principles. Many of the same provisions in U.S. agreements also appear
4 U.S. Trade Representative, 2016 Biennial Report on the Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act 80 June 2016).
See Kathleen Claussen, Separation of Trade Law Powers, 43 YALE J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2018).
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in European, Canadian, and Asian agreements, for example (with a notable exception of EU-African Economic
Partnership Agreements,6 which do not share the same level of complexity as the agreements to which I refer).
Borrowing language from other legislation or international instruments is not a new phenomenon. Taken together,
the present generation of trade agreements exhibits signs of convergence in respect of shared principles across
agreements and across geographic areas. Those strong forces are likely to influence the ability of both U.S. and
possibly some African state negotiators to move away from widely accepted norms and threshold principles in
discussions regarding future agreements.
While trade lawmakers have adopted wide-ranging FTAs as the preferred vehicle in the current generation of
the international trade system, FTAs have limitations, not least among them the fact that most remain untested in
dispute settlement as very few disputes have been adjudicated. Given these limitations, it may be prudent to
explore other economic instruments that could provide greater flexibility for U.S.-Africa trade and investment
engagement, other than a traditional FTA. Moreover, some evidence suggests that alternative instruments may
be preferable to certain African policy-makers who seek flexible rather than compliance-driven arrangements and
concrete projects rather than elaborate schemes such as those in the U.S. template trade agreement.7
Alternatives to an FTA
In 2016, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative published a report setting out possible alternatives to FTAs
for African trading partners, including "alternative reciprocal agreements" and "collaborative arrangements." The
alternative instruments would have a significantly narrower focus than an FTA, dealing primarily with tariffs and
other matters related to trade in goods, and would operate asymmetrically. The United States and some African
partners already have in place "collaborative arrangements," such as a U.S. cooperation agreement with the EAC
negotiated in 2014 to build capacity with respect to customs and trade in the EAC in return for commitments to
meet certain benchmarks." Whatever the direction of the Trump Administration or future U.S. administrations,
alternatives to FTAs that come under consideration ought to take account of both the substantive aims of and the
underlying differences in ideologies on regulations among trading partners and distinct economic frameworks
across different regional economic groups. Negotiators may also wish to account for the significant disparities
in market power between the United States and some of the poorest African economies in designing the structure
and reciprocal nature (or alternatives thereto) of any trade instrument.
There may be still further options that have not been robustly discussed. In U.S. trade law, there is no shortage of
other instruments regularly used by the executive. The executive branch engages in daily contract-making, con-
venes transnational and bilateral regulatory development meetings, and delivers messages to foreign partners on a
range of matters that have been brought under the widening umbrella of ancillary economic issues. On the more
formal side, the United States uses TIFAs to cooperate on trade and investment issues with a view to enhancing
reciprocal opportunities. In some instances, TIFAs have been used as precursors to FTAs, but that is not always
the case. Negotiators must consider whether a robust binding agreement is the best instrument to achieve shared
policy interests on issues such as market access, trade facilitation, and reductions in trade barriers.
Other "trade law" instruments concluded by the U.S. executive include nonenforceable jointly agreed action plans,
memoranda of understanding, and other multinominal documents by U.S. executive agencies in negotiation with for-
eign agencies. Is an enforcement mechanism an important element to ensure all partners live up to their commitments?
6 See Blown Off Course: A Trade Deal Between the EU and East Africa Is in Trouble, ECONOMIST (May 25, 2017).
JAMES THUo GATHII, AFRICAN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS As LEGAL REGIMES 2 (2011).
Cooperation Agreement Among the Partner States of the East African Community and the United States of America on Trade
Facilitation, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, and Technical Barriers to Trade, Feb. 26, 2015.
2017 387
AJIL UNBOUND
Have trade norms reached a stage of development where codification is no longer necessary in certain chapters? The
trend is certainly in the opposite direction, but creative lawyering and a willingness to work outside traditional frames
for meaningful engagement may become increasingly important as political climates evolve on both continents.
An additional foundational question is whether the African regional economic communities can usefully serve
as laboratories for larger collaborations. In seeking to avoid an unhealthy competition that disadvantages vulner-
able populations, governments may wish to consider on the fringes of the CFTA negotiations rethinking the
regional economic communities or at least not taking the preorganized regions as the default working units for
trans-Atlantic economic dialogue. The original 2002 U.S. Trade Representative Comprehensive Report on AGOA
implementation9 noted challenges with overlapping and conflicting regional entities already at that time, just as
some scholars10 have noted. The regions' variable geometry both allows each to move at its own pace, but also to
become stagnant along outdated political lines. In many respects, the regions are driven not by economic advan-
tage but rather by historical and strategic interests.
A final question is whether the regions are indeed the best conduits for the African markets of the twenty-first
century or whether other layers of governance should be considered. The present international trade law system
does not engage directly with local and subnational entities, for example. One effect of the current structure is that
municipal level actors often lose out on foreign direct investment opportunities, in addition to having a limited
opportunity to contribute to trade lawmaking. In a world in which local communities play an increasingly prom-
inent role in transnational commerce, and, moreover, where some of the most innovative and successful
approaches to development and investment are occurring at the local and subnational levels, it may be time for
an updated international egal approach and for the African continent to lead that charge among international trade
lawmakers. In many respects, cities are economic focal points, even though bilateral and multilateral texts do not
take account of diagonal and multilayered governance. At a minimum, the U.S. government, African trading part-
ners, and legal scholars could do more to acknowledge and manage this tapestry.
Conclusion
If past trends continue, the proliferation of FTAs around the world is likely to persist. As more countries seek
more rules-based arrangements with more trading partners, there is potential to craft important and appropriate
instruments that advance international aw values. Most signs suggest African governments will continue making
progress toward a CFTA. When it enters into force, the CFTA will constitute the world's largest free trade area in
terms of number of participants. It will bring together fifty-four African countries with a combined population of
more than one billion people and a combined gross domestic product of more than US $3.4 trillion. It will be truly
a "megaregional." At the same time, the African regional economic communities are likely to continue to deepen
their partnerships. In this way, the continent provides a reasonable proxy for similar trends on the world stage.
Disparate but productive legal developments draw from common norms to harmonize regulatory standards. The
larger normative cascade is producing universal principles for trade law instruments that will continue to be tested
as the United States and regions of Africa engage further in reducing barriers to trade.
9 U.S. Trade Representatve, 2002 Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa and
Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (May 2002).
10 GATHII, sura note 8, at 67.
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